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vPREFACE
NASA's role relating to human factors in aviation is found in its
charter*:
o To direct and exercise control over the research into and the
solution of problems of flight within and outside the earth's
atmosphere;
o
	
	 To improve the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and
efficiency of aeronautical vehicles;
o
	
	
To preserve the role of the United States as the leader in
aeronautical science and technology.
Since the end of World War II, NASA and its predecessor, the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, have recognized the
critical importance of man-machine interaction in the increasingly
r`
	
	
complex high technology aviation system. NASA's primary concern in
human factors has been with the application of scientific knowledge
s'	
and fundamental study, rather than with developmental or design
°.'	 problems.
F:.
NASA initiated a human factors research program at its Ames
Research Center in the 1950s, concentrating on pilot aircraft control
functions, and the present Human Factors in Aviation Safety research
program began in 1973. Today, NASA's program is focused in two
areas--Flight Management and Simulation Technology.
During the last decade, the emphasis of NASA's human factors
program has shifted from aircraft control to the perceptual and
cognitive skills necessary for effective decision making.
*U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Committee Print. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as
Amended, and Related Legislation.	 95th Congress, 2nd Session.
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. December 1978.
a
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The study of human factors in flight management is guided in
part by an aviation safety reporting system that provides evidence
of deficiencies in the aviation system that relate to the management
	
of information among the various system components. NASA's Aviation 	 1!
System Reporting System (ASRS) was initiated five years ago at the
request of the aviation community and the FAA to collect data
regarding operating problems and human errors in the aviation
system. Hypotheses based on these data underlie much of NASA's
human factors research and serve to illuminate the problems on which
work is most urgently needed. The system has provided data and
analytical studies for over 30 other agencies and organizations
within and outside of the government, and its methods are under
study for possible adoption by other nations. 	 J.
	
NASA ' s Human Factors and Simulation Technology program covers 	 I
research in all aspects of simulation, including hardware and
	
software improvement, computer configuration, improved visual cue 	 l
	
generation, optimal controlling methods of the pilot simulator	 a
system, and training methodology for making maximum use of the
available simulation technology.
NASA ' s capability in aeronautical human factors is enhanced by:	 li
i^
1. Close ties with all elements of the aviation community 	 ^{
through the formal mechanism of its advisory committee
structure and informally through contacts with DOD, FAA,
air carriers, aviation manufacturers, and user groups;	 n
n
2. The availability of facilities important to human factors,
including the Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft and
the Vertical Motion Simulator at Ames, and the Differential
Maneuvering Simulator at Langley;
3. NASA's status as an independent government agency that can
act as an objective third party and its history of
responsiveness to the needs of the aviation community;
4. A cadre of experienced human factors investigators that, 	 r
along with supporting staff, constitutes a group dedicated
to finding solutions to human factors problems in aviation.
r
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SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee has reviewed NASA's program of research in human
factors in the aircraft cockpit and a proposed program augmentation.
In the committee's Judgment the dramatic growth of microprocessor
technology makes it entirely feasible to automate increasingly more
functions in the aircraft cockpit; the promise of improved vehicle
performance, efficiency, and safety through automation makes highly
automated flight inevitable. However; the committee believes *_hdt an
organized data base and validated methodology for predicting the
effects of automation on human performance and thus on safety are
lacking and is concerned that without such a data base and validated
methodology for analyzing human performance, increased automation may
introduce new risks.
The committee concludes that NASA's effort should be concentrated
on developing methods and techniques for analyzing man-machine
interactions, including human workload and prediction of performance
and assessment of their effects on safety and reliability. Therefore,
the committee recommends that NASA, in its program of research,
concentrate on providing a methodology for accomplishing a predictive
human performance failure modes hazards analysis that could be
integrated with the methodology used fear the failure hazards analysis
of hardware to provide an overall system (man and machine) hazards
analysis methodology. In the committee's view, a comprehensive
research effort will be required to provide a data base to support
such a safety and reliability analysis methodology.
a
the proposed program
functions to man and
of principles and the
icability, leaving the
design of interfaces
The committee further recommends that
augmentation dealing with the allocation of
machine should concentrate on the acquisition
development of methodologies of general appl
formulation of specific guidelines for the
between man and machine to the industry.
The committee also reviewed the research and technology
development programs in aircrew-vehicle interaction in the Department
k
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of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration in light of
NASA's ongoing and planned program. The committee conclUes that
NASA and DOD programs are as well coordinated and mutually
supportive as can practically be achieved. It notes that the FAA's
Office of Engineering and Development recognizes that much of the
litmian factors research and development needed to meet its
responsibilities is addressed in programs being conducted by NASA
and the DOD, and continually draws upon the expertise and
capabilities of those agencies.
The committee notes that many aircraft accidents and incidents
are determined to have been caused by human error and points to the
importance of determining the causes of the human error. Such
information is absent in records of accident investigations. Thus,
the committee reconmends that NASA explore the feasibility of
establishing a program to identify and evaluate the cause of the
human error where it is deemed to be causal in an accident or
incident situation and, if feasible, undertake such a program.
i
INTRODUCTION
Safety statistics indicate that air transportation is the safest
mode of public transportation. Aviation safety has improved steadily
over the past two decades. This is due to improved reliability of
aircraft (made possible by technology advances in structure,
materials, engines, electronics, etc.) and improvements in the other
necessary parts of the system (air traffic control, communications,
weather forecasting, etc.). On the other hand, the statistics also
indicate that aircraft accidents attributed to human error continue to
occur and imply that some of those accidents could have been prevented
by the humans in the system.
Increased automation to reduce human workload and to augment human
information processing and communication is altering the role of human
operators in aviation, as well as in other high technology systems.
However, evolving systems, while designed to be safer and more
economically efficient than existing systems, actually could be less
safe and efficient if the changing role of the human operator is not
understood fully and planned for.
With the rapid growth of automation the human operator is becoming
increasingly a supervisor of computers, which in turn directly control
the machines. Thus, human abilities a:e being focused on the
outermost control loops. However, while less human involvement is
required for rote tasks, the human supervisor is being called upon to
oversee more interdependent control loops, to allocate his attention
among more displays, and to make more complex decisions.
While automation does not eliminate aircrew-vehicle interactions,*
it does alter them in ways that may affect crew performance, and how
*Man-machine interaction refers to the communication with and control
of machines by men. It is influenced by the art and science of
designing display and control devices and workplaces, allocating
functions between men and machines, and selecting and training
operators and maintenance personnel.
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that happens is not always understood fully. The need to determine
the causes of error in current operations and to design future
systems that will minimize the occurrence and effects of human error
calls for a comprehensive research program drawing on all available
resources, including those of NASA, FAA, DOD, industry, and academia.
While the human factors relating to "knobs and dials" cockpit
design are pretty well established and documented in human
engineering guides, principles of design for the new
human-computer-aircraft interactions are in an earlier phase of
development.
NASA and its predecessor, NACA, have been concerned with the
human factors of aircraft control since very early in the history of
aviation and in the 1950s initiated at the Ames Research Center a
human factors research program that concentrated on pilot
functions. NASA's current program--Human Factors in Aviation
Safety--began in 1973. Today, the program is concerned with two
areas--Flight Management and Simulation Technology.
The increasing awareness of the need to understand better the
human side of man-machine interaction, and the awareness that
research in human factors .en improve efficiency as well as aviation
safety, has led NASA to reexamine its program of research in this
area. NASA's review has resulted in a proposed augmentation of its
ongoing research program, to be focused on human factors in the
aircraft cockpit. To assure that its planning is appropriate to the
critical issues, NASA requested the National 	 earch Council's
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASr
	
to evaluate its
program. To accomplish the requested evaluation, the ASEB
established the ad hoc Committee on Aircrew-Vehicle System
Interaction. The committee was asked specifically to:
o	 assess the appropriateness, relevance, adequacy, and
timeliness of the program with respect to the needs and
o	 provide recommendations regarding the objectives, approach,
and content of the program plan.
To place the NASA program in context and to determine the degree
of coordination and mutual support among the government agencies
with responsibilities in aviation human factors, representatives of
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Federal Aviation
1 Administration (FAA) attended the committee's meetings and the
committee received briefings describing the DOD and FAA programs of
research and technology development in the field of aviation human
1	 factors. The DOD and FAA programs are described in Appendix A.
The DOD effort is coordinated among the military services and
NASA through the DOD Human Factors Engineering Technical Advisory
Group (HFE-TAG) and its subgroups. 	 The HFE-TAG consists of
it
4
5technical representatives from the various organizational elements
of the military services and NASA that have research and development
responsibility in the area of human factors er 4neering.
The FAA recognizes that much of the human factors research and
development needed to fulfill its responsibilities is addressed in
NASA d DOD programs. Accordingly, the FAA draws upon the
expertise and capabilities of these agencies, and there are a number
of programs that are conducted jointly by NASA and the FAA's Office
of Engineering and Development.
The ad hoc Committee on Aircrew-Vehicle System Interaction,
which is responsible for this report, met at the NASA Ames Research
Center, Mountain View, California on June 24-25, 1981 and at the
National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. on October 6-7,
1981.
ASSESSMENT OF NASA'S PROGRAM
NASA, recognizing the inevitable increased use of automated
equipment in the aviation system to improve system capacity and
economics, believes that this increased automation will affect the
performance of pilots, air traffic controllers, and other human
operators in unplanned and unexpected ways, not all of them
desirable. In NASA's view, the data base on the capabilities and
limitations of the human(s) in the system is inadequate, and there is
no widely understood and accepted technology for the allocation of
functions to man and machine. NASA predicts that, in the rush to
apply the rapidly expanding new technology in electronics and
avionics, insufficient attention will be given to the effects of
automation on the human operator(s).
To provide the data base and technology it sees as required to
avoid costly design and operating errors and possible hazards in
future aircraft, NASA has proposed to augment its ongoing research
effort in human factors. NASA's stated goal is to:
permit timely development of a human factors technology
base to assist the aviation community in implementing
more highly automated systems without incurring perfor-
mance problems in the humans who must operate those systems.
The research program augmentation has been designed to build on
the current ongoing program and to make use of as much past research
and present knowledge as possible to develop new knowledge and
technology through research in human factors.
The ad hoc committee agrees with NASA's assessment that the
dramatic advances being made in microprocessor technology will produce
an equally dramatic increase in automation of aviation systems.
Consequently, the committee also shares the concern that sufficient
attention may not be given to the effects of such automation on the
human operator in the system, not because the operator is overlooked,
but because adequate data on the effects of automation on human
performance and thus on system safety are lacking.
7
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The committee points out that the full range of human factors
activity only recently has gained wide recognition as a valid
technical field of design that is critically important to the
conceptual design of the modern aircraft system. Because of its
relatively recent acceptance, it has not yet developed the required
coherent data base of technical information and applicable
methodologies, as have the other areas of aircraft design such as
aerodynamics, structures, and electronics. Thus, the need for
research, not only to provide the information that will lead to
improved designs, but also to predict, evaluate, and verify the
value of the improvement. The committee observes that NASA is
attempting to provide the leadership necessary to develop a data
base and help establish direction for others in the field.
NASA has been involved in assessing man-machine interaction
throughout the history of aviation. Recent major programs such as
Short Take Off and Landing (STOLAND), Terminal Configured Vehicle
(TCV), and the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASKS) have been
instrumental in identifying the nature and extent of man-machine
interaction concerns associated with high-capability digital
avionics. While identification of problems inherent in the
application of new technologies is necessary to introducing them
safely, problem identification alone is not enough. Rapid
introduction requires an established knowledge base and validated
assessment methodologies to permit timely and effective applications
without incurring unreasonable risk.
The ad hoc committee reviewed and discussed NASA's program of
research into the human factors aspects of the aircrew-vehicle
system in two separate sessions. In the first session the committee
reviewed NASA's ongoing program, and in the second session reviewed
NASA's proposed program augmentation.
NASA's program is described in Appendixes B and C.
NASA's Ongoing Program
The committee's overall judgment of NASA's ongoing program is
that the work being conducted consists of individual projects in
which, although the projected results of each one will be valuable,
a central guiding question or purpose to provide focus to the
overall program is lacking. The committee believes that this
situation can be corrected through redirection of effort in selected
elements of the ongoing program to support the goals of the
recommended program augmentation that is discussed subsequently.
The committee recommends that NASA direct its program to providing
the data base and methodology for measuring, understanding, and
controlling human workload and predicting performance, including the
understanding and prediction of human error.
iNASA's ongoing program includes five elements: Flight Mangement
Research, Simulation Technology, Aviation Safety, Workload/
Performance Measures, and Duman Response to Noise. Each of these
elements is described in Appendix B. The committee's assessment of
each element is included in the following paragraphs.
The Flight Management Research element of NASA's ongoing program
ti appears to be appropriate, particularly those efforts dealing with
the identification of types of human error, human decision making,
and crew-error theories. The work on the cockpit display of traffic
information will be of value so long as it remains focused on basic
concepts.
The subelement "automation" is currently in an exploratory stage
to define the problem area. It is intended as an introductory
effort to support the proposed augmentation element, Man-Automation
Function Allocation Strategies. Significant questions have to do
with how to minimize crew boredom, apathy, and loss of skill, each
of which is a cause of human error/failure. It is the committee's
view that much of the effort planned for this subelement of the
ongoing program is related to the understanding and avoidance of
human error in future systems, and it is recommended that the work
k be planned and directed to support the proposed program augmentation
element, Man-Machine Reliability Assessment Techniques.
The subelement "resource management" is an effort to improve
aircrew performance by better definition and execution of the roles
of crew members. The program originally was defined and initiated
by NASA, and many airlines are adopting the results of the program.
NASA's role now appears to be largely in refining techniques and
providing information to potential users. This is an area in which
NASA should be looking to others to assume responsibility for
program continuity.
The "crew models" subelement is another effort that the
committee believes would be of greater value applied to gaining a
better understanding of human error.
The work under the Simulation Technology element could provide
valuable data to enhance the utility of simulation as a tool for
studying and clarifying man-machine integration problems, The three
subelements currently under way or planned are aimed at improving
understanding of what perceptual features are important or how to
provide higher fidelity of simulated elements that are now believed
to be important. More needed is investigation of the importance of
the perceptual cues relative to one another and how they
interrelate. With regard to perceptual fidelity, a distinction must
be made between simulator characteristics suitable for training and
those required for aircraft development research.
Experimental simulator requirements are considerably different
from training simulator requirements. This is due to the fact that
9
the experimental simulators may be used to estimate the actual
performance that can be obtained by the operational system. In this
research and development application, high fidelity may be extremely
important. The alternative to high fidelity simulation is actual
flight testing of the system, which may delay decisions, make
changes very expensive, and increase risks to test crews.
In contrast, much research suggests that very good transfer of
training
	 can	 occur	 with	 relatively	 primitive	 simulation	 and
relatively
	 low	 fidelity.	 Obviously,	 this	 will	 depend	 on	 the
specific training objectives.	 Nevertheless,
	
reliance on simulation
for training of skills that are highly dependent on totally valid
ry perceptual/motor 	 cues	 is	 not	 a	 realistic	 objective	 because	 some
J cues,	 particularly	 sustained-motion	 cues,	 cannot	 be	 represented
validly.	 Fortunately,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 any	 specific
sensory cues are uniquely essential to effective training.
	
Although
some factors potentially important in training, such as fear and the
mental	 set	 associated with	 actually	 flying,	 may	 not	 be	 present,
comparable	 stresses	 can	 be	 introduced	 through	 complex	 mission
scenarios
	 and	 automatically	 adaptive	 side	 tasks.	 Operational
3 doctrine and procedures (particularly emergency procedures), effects
of environmental variables, and fundamental skills already are being
taught more effectively and economically in simulators than in their
aircraft counterparts.
The focus of
	 the NASA program in this area is considered too
narrow.	 Very little is known concerning the relative weight of the
various	 cues,	 e.g.,	 how they	 interrelate
	
and	 whether	 they modify
behavior.	 Research on these fundamental questions would be valuable
in many respects and would lead, ultimately, to a much superior and
more cost effective simulation capability. 	 It is recommended that
NASA	 restructure	 the	 Simulation
	
Technology	 program	 element	 to
include research into sensory-perceptual-motor theory and define a
more	 systematic	 long-term	 program.	 Hardware	 design,	 except	 for
specific needs recognized as essential for fidelity of NASA research
simulators, should be left to the manufacturers.
The	 Aviation	 Safety	 element	 consists
	
of	 two	 subelements,
circadian desychronosis and
	 the	 aviation safety	 reporting	 system.
Circadian	 desynchronosis
	
is	 an	 important	 problem,	 but	 the	 work
should continue only 	 if	 there	 is adequate	 support	 to undertake a
systematic	 and	 comprehensive	 investigation	 of	 the many	 variables
involved.
The	 aviation safety reporting	 system (ASRS)	 that NASA manages
provides valuable data regarding certain incidents and near misses
in the air system that otherwise would not become known since they
do not result in accidents or otherwise reportable incidents.	 With
a	 continuing
	 awareness	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 system	 and	 its
shortcomings, the program is providing worthwhile data and should be
continued.
S
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The intent of the work being conducted under the element
Workload/performance Measures is to develop a valid, reliable
methodology for measuring workload, particularly mental workload, to
assist in understanding and evaluating man-machine interface
^E concepts and designs, the goal being to assure that workload will be
neither so high nor so low that the potential for error is
increased. This has been a controversial and important issue that
is generating a great deal of research in many agencies all around
y. the world. No universal solution has been found and none may be for
some time. NASA could make a valuable contribution by coordinating
and providing :Focus for other researchers. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects .agency (DARPA), military laboratories,
universities, and overseas organizations are working intensively on
this problem. It is recommended that NASA take the initiative and
work with others in the field to establish a mechanism for
coordinating the research being done to develop a reliable
methodology for measuring physical and mental workload.
The committee considered the work being conducted under the
element human Response to Noise on the effects of aircraft noise on
people on the ground, and concludes that it has little in common
with	 the	 research	 activities
	
in	 aircrew--vehicle	 system
interactions. It is recommended that the work be removed from the
aircrew--vehicle interaction program and conducted under another
prograin category.
k1s proposed Program Augmentation
In its program augmfnntation, NASA proposes to identify gaps in
existing knowledge concerning human Interaction with automated
aviation systems, to do the basic research to close these gaps, and
to organize the results so as to be more useful to the aviation
community. The knowledge gaps that require human factors research
will be identified both through surveys and through evaluation of
promising new models of the human operator.
NASA states that close liaison will be maintained with
manufacturers, designers, the FAA, and DOD to ensure the usefulness
and usability of the knowledge base generated in this program. The
development of this knowledge base into quantitative models is one
goal. However, the overriding goal is to understand why human
errors are made, and to develop the data and methodologies to permit
designers to create systems that minimize them.
NASA's goal is to improve the existing knowledge base of systems
factors (hardware, software, procedures, etc.) that tend to induce
human error.	 The objective will be to develop validated
generalizable guidelines and not to develop hardware. Final
validation of the guidelines to be developed will be accomplished in
a few carefully selected flight tests. In those cases in which
flight tests will be made, an attempt will be made to use systems
ll
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predictive human performance failure modes analysis that could be
12
that	 the	 industry	 or	 the FAA has	 developed	 to	 a	 breadboard	 or
prototype stage*
The	 program augmentation proposed 	 by	 NASA	 and	 titled	 "Human
Engineering of Automated Aviation Systems" comprise four elements:
I.	 Man-Automation Function Allocation Strategies: 	 to develop
a	 technology	 base to aid	 systems	 designers	 in allocating
functions	 to man	 and	 to	 machine	 and	 in	 selecting	 from
alternative designs early in the development process.
Ii.
	 Man-Machine	 Interface
	 Design	 Guidelines:	 to	 develop	 a
technology base for choosing advanced displays and advanced
input	 devices	 for	 effective	 information	 transfer	 between
the operator and the system.
III.	 Workload and	 Performance Measurement Methods; 	 to develop
methods for assessing crew workload and 	 performance	 in a
manual/automated environment.
IV.	 Man-Machine Reliability Assessment Techniques.,	to develop
methodology	 to	 assess	 overall	 reliability	 of	 the
111a.i-machine systems.
The	 first	 two	 augmentation	 elements,	 Man-Automation	 Function
Allocation Strategies 	 and Man-Machine	 Interface Design Guidelines,
are	 intended	 to provide additional	 knowledge	 that	 can be	 used	 in
selecting	 and	 designing	 future	 system functions	 in	 situations	 in
which automation may play a major role in man-machine systems. 	 The
Man-Machine Interface Design Guidelines element focuses on methods
of	 using	 advanced	 technology	 options	 to	 minimize	 information
transfer	 problems.	 The	 second	 two	 elements,	 Workload	 and
Performance	 Measurement	 Methods	 and	 Man machine	 Reliability
Assessment Techniques, are intended to provide assessment tools and
methods for evaluation of specific concepts.
Appendix C provides some detail regarding the planned content of
each of the proposed program augmentation elements listed above
Of the four elements of the proposed program augmentation, 	 the
committee	 concludes	 that	 NASA's	 effort	 should	 be	 concentrated	 on
elements III and IV--Workload and Performance Measurement Methods,
and	 Mair-Machine	 Reliability	 Assessment	 Techniques.	 In	 the
committee's	 judgment,	 these	 two	 critical	 elements	 are	 fundamental
and well suited to NASA's capabilities.	 It is recommended that NASA
incorporate in these two elements the tasks that are pertinent to
them	 but,	 as	 presented	 to	 the	 committeeo	 are	 included	 under	 the
other	 two	 elements	 in	 the	 program	 as	 proposed	 and	 outlined	 in
Append,41\ C.	 Further,	 it is recommended that the work be focused to
providing	 the	 data	 base	 and	 methodology	 for	 accomplishing	 a
A
aintegrated with the methodology used for the failure modes analysis
of hardware to provide a hazards analysis methodology for the
overall system (man and machine).
► It is the committee's judgment that the work on the development
of methodologies and guidelines contained in elements I and 11,
Man-Automation Function Allocation Strategies and Man-Machine
Interface Design Guidelines, should be concentrated on the
development of principles and the development of methodology of
general applicability, leaving its application and the formulation
k	 of specific strategies and guidelines to the industry.
The mental workload of both aircrew and ground controllers has
emerged in recent years as a matter of concern internationally.
This includes both sustained and transient demand levels, and
interaction with stress, fatigue, crew-manning, procedures, air or
ground allocation of functions, and other factors. At present there
is little agreement on how to measure mental workload (e.g., whether
by physiological indices, secondary tasks, or subjective scaling),
but an understanding of the total task loading--mental and
physical--as well as human limitations is essential to utilizing the
contributions of both man and machine most efficiently and safely.
The question of crew size has arisen many times over the years
in both civil and military aviation. The difficulty in dealing with
the problem is compounded by lack of methodology and data stated in
common scientific terminology that are reliable, organized, and in
usable form.
NASA's proposed approach to the program element Workload and
Performance Measurement Methods is empirical, involving a variety of
pilots, aircraft types, and situationF. Considering the limited
►,►nderstanding of the theoretical basis for cogaitive processes, the
experimental approach seems the most likel y to produce timely usable
results. This is considered to be an important subject and well
suited to NASA capabilities. The work must be accomplished
thoroughly and objectively if it is to achieve the acceptance and
utility desired. The objectivity and broad scope of interests that
NASA can bring to bear on this subject greatly increase the
likelihood of success.
NASA should examine the effect of workload, particularly under
stress, on the performance of the operator. Assessment of
performance is a fundamental requirement for any total system
evaluation. Improvement in the reliability of such measurement is
very important. Assessment of workload is useful only if related to
performance and performance breakdown. Methods of analyzing
workload and performance to be obtained with alternative concepts
would be especially useful in reducing design uncertainty and the
need for redesign, resulting in a better product with reduced
development cost in time and money.
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The second recommended element, Man-Machine Reliability
Assessment Techniques, as presented to the committee (see
Appendix B, IV), was proposed as a subtask of the other three
elements of the proposed program augmentation. The committee
recommends this element be strengthened. What is needed is both
study of man-machine reliability and study of how safety is affected
by human performance.
Also,	 the	 word	 "assessment"	 generally	 connotes	 a	 limited
I activity, i.e., simply to predict and measure. 	 In this instance, it
should	 include	 methodology	 for	 prediction	 and	 measurement	 and
,i
development of remedial options.
To be more descriptive of the work the committee believes this
element should include, it should be entitled: 	 "Man-Machine Safety
and	 Reliability	 Analysis	 Techniques:	 to	 develop	 methodology	 for
analyzing overall safety and reliability of man-machine systems."
The committee believes that the subelements and research tasks
required	 to	 provide	 the	 data	 base	 to	 permit	 a	 system-reliability
assessment (including a human error hazard analysis) will constitute
a comprehensive research effort.	 It will be generic in nature and
will,	 ultimate!-,	 provide	 understanding	 of	 human	 error	 and	 the
predictive design tool needed by aircraft designers and by the FAA
for aircraft and airman certification.
This	 program	 element	 deals	 with	 two	 identified	 problem
areas--prediction	 of	 human	 error	 and	 prediction	 of	 man-machine
effectiveness.	 The program emphasis appears to be on assessment and
evaluation,	 but it is important	 that	 the methodology be developed
for	 use	 prior	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 hardware	 as	 well	 as	 for
analysis	 of	 operating	 hardware.	 Existing	 simulation,	 flight-test
techniques,	 and	 operating	 hazari	 analysis	 provide	 the	 means	 for
assessing man-machine systems once operating hardware is available.
An intermediate goal of developing assessment techniques that depend
on hands-on testing is reasonable,	 but a basic objective should be
to	 develop	 methodology	 that	 can	 be	 used	 for	 prediction	 and
application throughout a system's entire life cycle.
a
A subtask of	 this	 program element	 is	 adapting and developing
theories of human error. 	 An essential step in this process will be
the development of suitable definitions of human error. 	 NASA should
involve a cross section of the aviation community in this task, thus
assuring	 working	 definitions	 of	 error	 that	 will	 have	 broad
applicability.
I
The	 final	 step	 in	 this	 element--that	 of	 evaluating	 the
system-wide impact of human error--can provide an analytic means to
establish the	 relative	 importance	 of	 various	 types	 of	 error.	 As
such,	 it has significant potential for use as a preliminary design
aid.
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This portion of the proposed program augmentation has the
potential to provide several new methodologies of broad
applicability. Since most methodologies can be independent of
specific device technology, the methods will be useful for both
design support and evaluation and adaptable to industries other than
t	 aviation.
While extensive work has been done to delineate methods of
analyzing and controlling hardware failures (reliability engineering
technology), relatively little has been done to understand and
predict human error in relation not only to the machine but also to
man's total environment. It is important because failures and
destructive accidents in systems are becoming more and more costly.
The revolution in air vehicle reliability and avionics systems
reliability during the past ten years makes it important to
establish quantitative data on man's reliability. To estabilish
man's role in future aviation systems, his performance must be put
into a form that is compatible with the equations used to establish
the vehicle system reliability.
Current and next-generation aircraft can be considered to be
transitional between man-dependent vehicles and fully automatic
vehicles for many commercial and military missions. In future
missions man may monitor/operate sensors while an automatic system
flies the mission profile. A methodology for human performance
failure and hazards analysis, and the data base required to develop
it and to use it, will be needed to examine and define the function
of man in order to determine for what functions human presence will
be required in such a vehicle.
The insufficiency of available data is critical, and the lack of
a framework within which the data may be used effectively is also
critical. A methodology is needed for accomplishing a predictive
human performance failure and hazards analysis that ultimately could
be integrated with failure modes hazards analysis methodology used
for hardware to provide an overall system (man and machine) hazards
analysis methodology. In this connection, the use of such an
analytic methodology should include provision for feedback of
operational information to ascertain how systems are performing so
that the hazards analyses can be improved and upgraded continually.
Human error deserves serious scientific attention. In the
committee's view, human error is often misused as an alleged cause
of accidents and it and its causes are little understood. The
nuclear power industry just now is ordering that all operating
plants do a complete system safety and reliability analysis
including human errors (using fault trees, event trees,
cause-consequence diagrams, and the like). NASA might well benefit
by some strong liaison and technology transfer with that effort.
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cOTHER CONCERNS AND ISSUES
As stated earlier, the primary task of the ad hoc committee was to
review and assess NASA's program of research in human factors directed
to problems of aircrew-vehicle system interaction and recommend any
changes considered necessary to enhance the effectiveness of that
program. The results of the committee's review are contained in the
preceding sections of this report.
During its review, the ad hoc committee exposed related issues
that, although they have not been subjected to detailed analysis, it
considered important enougb to bring to the attention of NASA and
others. These issues are briefly set out here.
Many incidents and accidents are determined to have been caused by
human error and the committee judges it important to determine the
cause of the human error. There is a dearth of information in cases
involving human performance, and it is recommended that NASA explore
the feasibility of establishing a program specifically to identify and
evaluate the possible causes of pilot error in accidents and incidents
deemed to be caused by human error and to identify how similar
accidents and incidents can be avoided in the future. It is suggested
that as a complement or extension of the Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS) project, NASA could pursue the investigation, aaalysis,
and simulated re-creation of selected incidents and accidents
involving crew-related causes or factors. The cases selected should
be those in which the evidence available would suggest that the
antecedent events leading to human error or errors might be expected
to cause other pilots to make similar errors a high proportion of the
time.
The air traffic control system invades the cockpit of commercial
transport and general aviation aircraft in a major way and is a
prominent element in the aircrew-vehicle system interface. As
automation of the air traffic control system and of airborne systems
increases, design of the aircrew-vehicle system interface becomes more
complex. It raises questions such as: "Can pilots, with improved
cockpit display systems, take on functions currently performed by the
air traffic controllers on the ground?"	 "How will new display
17	
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technologies be applied?" To resolve these and other questions,
better means are needed for modeling, testing, and predicting the
effects of various alternatives on system efficiency and safety.
The committee also believes NASA should take a more holistic
approach to experimentation, i.e., ex periments should account for as
many potentially critical variables as possible. Whatever their
number, if critical variables are held constant in an experiment,
unless the fixed values are close to those found operationally,
findings can be grossly inaccurate when applied to operational
situations. The use of economical mult• ifactor experimental designs,
pioneered by the chemical industry, can reduce the cost of aviation
experiments and greatly improve the validity and generalizability of
results.
n
k
18
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF OTHER GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS IN HUMAN
FACTORS RESEARCH IN AIRCREW-VEHICLE SYSTEM INTERACTION
Department of Defense
The DOD R&D effort relevant to the interaction of the
pilot/aircrew and the aircraft is conducted as part of a Training
and Personnel Systems Technology (TPST) program, supervised by the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
The major elements of the program are:
o Human Factors
o Manpower and Personnel
o Education and Training
o Simulation and Training Devices
The work of interest to the ad hoc Committee falls under Human
Factors and Simulation and Training Devices.
The total TPST program is funded at $212 million in FY 1981, and
$265 million is planned in FY 1982. Over 59 percent of these funds
are devoted to advance development and prototyping simulators and
training devices. The areas of Human Factors, Manpower and
Personnel, and Education and Training re-c eive the remaining funds in
approximately equal proportions. The reason for having such a large
proportion of the research and development funds devoted to training
is that DOD spends at least $10 billion per year for training
personnel and from $1 billion to $3 billion per year for equipment
used in training. New high technology weapon systems are being
introduced into the inventory at a time when there appears to be a
severe lack of qualified personnel to operate and maintain them
throughout their life cycle. This training need, now and in the
future, is reflected in the major emphasis in thF DOD program on
simulators and training devices.
The distribution among the services, taking all funds into
consideration (basic research through prototype development), gives
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Cthe Navy 56 percent, the Army 25 percent, and the Air Force
19 percent. However, if simulator prototyping funds are removed from
the tetal, $125 million were distributed in FY 1981--Army 38 percent,
Navy 33 percent, and Air Force 29 percent. In FY 1982, the Army will
receive 35 percent, the Navy 35 percent, and the Air Force 30 percent
of approximately $144 million. The Navy has the largest prototype
development program in this area since they are only recently
developing and using simulators for training in shipboard skills.
The DOD effort is coordinated among the militd::y services and NASA
through the DOD Human Factors Engineering Technical Advisory Group
(HFE-TAG) and its subgroups. The HFE-TAG consists of technical
representatives from the various organizational elements of each of
the military services and NASA with research and development
responsibility in human factors enginec:iing.
The elements of the DOD TPST program that are directly related to
NASA's program of research and technology development are Human
Factors and Simulation Technology.
Federal Aviation Administration
The Federal Aviation Act charges the FAA with responsibility for
assuring safe and effective use of the national airspace and for
fostering civil aeronautics and air commerce. The FAA meets these
responsibilities primarily through three major areas of activity:
o	 Development, operation, and continuous improvement of the
air traffic control system;
o Promulgation of necessary regulatory action to assure that
elements operating in the national airspace can and do
operate safely;
o Support and conduct of research and development required to
improve the safety and effectiveness of operations in the
national airspace.
Within the last several years, there has been growing recognition
within the aviation community of the important link between better
understanding of human capabilities and limitations and gains in the
efficiency and safety of aeronautical operations.
In response to the 1975 DOT Secretary's Task Force Report on the
FAA Safety Mission, the FAA undertook to enhance its work in safety
and to establish a coherent, coordinated program, drawing on the work
of the several cognizant FAA elements and on that of other government
agencies (NASA and DOD). Under the direction of the Office of System
Engineering Management, and with the support of FAA's Office of Flight
:.	 Operations, Office of Aviation Safety, Air Traffic Service and Airways
a
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Facilities Service, a program was initiated with the goal of aircrew
and controller performance enhancement and error reduction. Programs
were developed within a modest budget, utilizing primarily FAA and
NASA resources, with emphasis on available resources and facilities
within the government.
In late 1980 and early 1981, in part spurred by increasing
emphasis on the issue of crew complement and crew workload and an
increasing emphasis on automation, FAA held a series of
government/industry/user workshops to gain additional perspective on
the problem. These workshops resulted in recommendations ranging from
general comments on program content and execution to specific research
in experimental design methods.
Each of the efforts described above resulted in recommendations
for additional work and more emphasis on the problem of human
capabilities and limitations, which, it is conceded generally,
constitutes the single most important cause of accidents and
fatalities in aviation.
The FAA concludes from these efforts by industry and government
that, while highly valuable work has been and is being done not only
by NASA, DOD, and FAA, but also by industry and universities, there
are fundamental, issues of basic motivation and human capabilities on
which valid scientific data are clearly insufficient and on which a
great deal of research remains to be done. These are objective
measures of workload; methods of reducing complacency, inattention,
and boredom; and the design of a truly optimal balance between man and
machine tasks.
The diversity of recommendations made to the FAA could be used to
create a very extensive series of programs and activities relating to
human capabilities and limitations. However, the FAA believes that
its efforts should be confined specifically to its mission and
responsibilities and should emphasize those efforts with directly
traceable links to practical actions that can save lives. FAA
believes it should follow progress in broader gauge, basic research
and technical and scientific investigations and support them when they
are perceived to be relevant. Such research should continue to be
performed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Department of Defense, industry, and universities, with the support
and collaboration of FAA:
Based on this rationale, the following renea*_'Li and development
areas clearly have a component of human fak:tors that must be
considered by the FAA.
o	 Research and studies tr^ 	 eve more sclontific human factors
design guidelines,
	
and critc" 1 from the perspective
of human capabilities
	
limitation
i
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	1	 o	 Development of better guidelines for operational procedures
and system designs to achieve optimum aircrew/ATC
interactions as new capabilities are introduced into aircraft
and the ATC system;
o Continuing analysis to identify areas in which research
results can lead to improvements in safety or system
performance.
Under its Aircrew Performance Enhancement and Error Reduction
program (APEER), the FAA has a number of projects currently under way
that address some of the issues in the above areas, some of which are
cooperative efforts with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. The APEER program has provided the nucleus for the
Aircrew Human Factors program with a broadened range of concerns.
Additional projects have been identified for inclusion in this new
program, and more will be identified as the work progresses. Current
or planned FAA and Joint FAA/NASA projects are listed in Table 1.
Projects independently planned by NASA and DOD are not shown. These
	
_	 projects are monitored by the FAA and relevant data and results
utilized as appropriate in its program.
TABLE 1 FAA Enginooring and Developmont litiman Factors
Program (Fiscal Year 1982/1983)
Project Funding ($1,000)
I'llot Workload Measures 784
Aircraft Alerting Systons Flight Phaso Monitoring 836
I'ilot Fnators•Navigntion 327
Collision Avoidance System Display Design Gaidelh ►es 270
Hcad•Up Display ('light Evalantion 522
Data Llnk Weather Informntion 99
Advanced General Aviation Display Cortification
Gtddelines
Privato Pilot Cortitioallon and Proficiency (Simulator) 242
'rraining for Unproved Decision Making 291
Cockpit Data Managen ►ont Requirements and Analysis
(Evolving National Air Spaco) 200
Separation/Navigation Standards -
Cockpit Display ofTraffic Infor ►natlon 1,703
Commutor/Air Taxi twinan Factors Problems 480
iym 5,754
The FAA recognizes that much of the human factors research and
development needed to fulfill its responsibilities is addressed in
programs being conducted by other government agencies. Accordingly,
the FAA has drawn and will continue to draw upon the considerable
expertise and capabilities in those agencies, especially NASA and DOD.
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The human factors staff and facilities of NASA are perceived to
be especially critical to the success of the FAA program. Joint
efforts such as the Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI)
and head-Up Display (EIUD) projects are examples of such activity.
Just as important are such basic research programs -s flight deck
automation, flight crew workload and performance assessment, and
simulation technology. Also, NASA possesses extensive research
facilities that can be used to evaluate various concepts such as
line-oriented flight training (LOFT), thus minimixinLi the reed for
the FAA to develop new research facilities. Similarly, the basic
and applied research being conducted by DOD in human engineering,
system operation, and maintenance are important to the purposes of
the FAA human factors program.
Through established coordination channels and interagency
agreements, the FAA's Office of the Associate Administrator for
Engineering and Development continually seeks to strengthen
interrelationships with NASA and DOD to ensure that the expertte
and .facilities in those agencies are used as fully as poss.1ble in
its aircrew human factors program.
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF NASA'S ONGOING PROGRAM
NASA's ongoing program includes five elements: Flight Management,
Simulation Technology, Aviation Safety, Workload/Performance Measures,
and Human Response to Noise. The program is carried on at the Ames
and Langley Research Centers and the Dryden Flight Research Facility
with a total of $7.7 million in funding and 78 full-time civil service
personnel in FY 1982. The 78 civil service personnel are augmented by
students, grantees, and contractor and support personnel who are
funded through this program.
Flight Management: NASA's goal in flight management research is
to improve the scope and reliability of aircrew performance by
providing a data base for optimum determination of crew roles, flight
procedures, and control/display requirements.
There are four subelements; Cockpit Display of Traffic
Information, The Role of Automation, Resource Management, and Crew
Modeling.
(a) Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI)--NASA is
carrying out a program jointly with the FAA to assess the
potential advantages and liabilities of CDTI. Work to date
has been focused on developing a candidate display format and
on part-task simulation evaluations of pilot ability to use
CDTI for self-spacing and self-merging tasks. Upcoming work
will focus on full-mission simulation studies in various
scenarios so that workload assessments and possible
detrimental effects of CDTI also can be evaluated.
(b) The Role of Automation--NASA is beginning a research program
to aid aircraft and air traffic control systems designers in
allocating functions to man and to machine.
(c) Resource Management--NASA seeks to develop methods of helping
aircrews identify and apply the most effective human,
technical, and mechanical resources to achieve safe,
economical, and expeditious flight. Present work involves
studying	 pilot	 responses	 to	 in-flight	 events,	 and
25	
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identifying resource management problems in commuter airline
operations.
a
	(d) Crew Modeling--NASA seeks to describe pilot behavior in
mathematically precise models. These models then are used to
predict the effects of alternative cockpit and air traffic
	
control system designs and procedures.
	
In FY 1982)
y development of a Monte Carlo mathematical model that includes
inputs to the crew members and probabilities of crew outputs
for various situations will continue. Previous models have
been used to describe the behavior of single crew members.
The present model, dubbed "PROCRU," will describe the
behavior of the entire crew. This model then will be used in
testing the effects of various types and levels of automation
on crew performance.
Simulation Technology: The goal of this work is to increase the
capability of simulation for replacing active flight time in research,
development, and training. Three subelements are included in the
FY 1982 program: Motion/Visual Cue Substitution, Low Visibility Scene
Generation, and Simulation Fidelity Assessment.
(a) Motion/Visual Cue Substitution--Efforts here are to determine
how much motion cueing can be effected using visual cues. A
model of visual/vestibular cue interaction and a method of
measuring "simulator motion deficit" (difference in motion
between the aircraft and the simulator) are being developed.
(b) Low Visibility Scene Generation--This work involves
developing a model of fog and a method of evaluating
candidates for simulation techniques.
(c) Simulation Fidelity Assessment--A method for basing level of
simulator fidelity in user needs has been developed and will
be tested in FY 1982.
Aviation Safety:* The goal of this research is to identify
deficiencies and discrepancies in the national aviation system as a
basis for improving the current system and designing a future system.
It has two subelements; the Aviation Safety Reporting System and
Circadian Desynchronosis (jet lag).
*It will be appreciated that the caption "Aviation Safety" as used
here does not include all the work (most of the remainder of the NASA
program) that contributes significantly to accident prevention and
increasing accident survivability.
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kt (a) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)--The ASRS is an FAA-
sponsored, NASA-managed incident reporting system. It is an
anonymous, nonpunitive, voluntary, before-the-accident system
in which anyone who witnesses an unsafe occurrence can file a
report. NASA performs a number of data base searches and
studies each year to detect trends.
(b) Circadian De sync hrono sis--Thi s program is an attempt to
quantify the effects of fatigue and circadian desynchronosis
on aircrew performance and to develop ameliorative measures
where necessary.
Workload/ Performance Measures: The goal of this research is to
develop improved techniques and methods for conducting empirical
investigations into aviation human factors issues. During FY 1982,
NASA plans to develop candidate measures for each of the components of
workload (cognitive, psychomotor, and emotional) and evaluate their
sensitivity to related factors such as age, experience, task demands,
stress, fatigue, and type of aircraft. Alternative approaches to such
evaluation include subjective reports and objective measures of eye
scan, secondary task performance, and physiological correlates. In
addition, NASA/Ames will be generating a practical guide for selecting
and applying workload measures.
Human Response to Noise: The goal of this research is to minimize
the effects of aircraft noise on passengers and on airport
communities. There are three subelements of this research:
quantification of single and multiple noises on the human ear,
development of methods of assessing and minimizing the effects of
aircraft noise on airport communities, and development of better
understanding of how noise and vibration combine to affect passenger
acceptance of aircraft ride quality.
NASA/Langley's aircraft noise synthesizer is the world's most
advanced facility for studying the effects of aircraft noise on
humans. Using this facility, a means for measuring the effects of
aircraft noise on airport communities has been developed. The
technique, called ALAMO (Airport Noise Levels Assessment Model), is
being validated and is being evaluated for its ability to predict the
decrement in noise effects derivable from varying aircraft approach
and departure flight profiles. Other work on noise effects is being
done on assessing the validity of time-of-day weightings in cumulative
airport noise metrics and on assessing the combined effects of noise
and vibration in various helicopters.
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APPENDIX C
NASA PROPOSED PROGRAM AUGMENTATION
HUMAN ENGINEERING OF AUTOMATED AVIATION SYSTEMS
The program augmentation proposed by NASA is comprised of four
segments:
I. Man-Automation Function Allocation Strategies
II. Man-Machine Interface Design Guidelines
III. Workload and Performance Measurement Methods
IV. Man-Machine Reliability Assessment Techniques
A statement of the goal, the resources to be allocated, and a
narrative description of the approach to be used to obtain the goal in
each of the proposed program segments is contained in the following
paragraphs.
It should be noted that in the NASA plan presented, the data
necessary to accomplish segment IV are to be obtained from the
research effort conducted under segments I, II and III.
	
I.	 Man-Machine Function Allocation Strategies
GOAL: Develop a technology base to aid systems designers in
allocating functions to man and to machine, and in
selecting from alternative designs early in the development
process.
RESOURCES:
Fiscal Year	 1983 1984 1985 1986	 1987	 1988
Funding ($1000'x) 1,950 2,350 2,000 2,000 2,400 2,400
Direct Man-Years	 8	 10	 10	 ' 12	 14	 14
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APPROACH:
0
Perform state-of-the-art review to develop heuristic design
data base. The output will be a delineation of what is known
and what is not known about human capabilities, limitations,
and tendencies with automated systems. Investigation will
not be limited to aviation, but will include other fields
such as power generation, automobile manufacturing, and
ground transportation, in which experience has been accrued
with differential sensitivities of human operation to
alternative automated system designs. As with the other data
bases developed in this program augmentation, it will be made
available to other researchers, the FAA, and industry.
Undertake research to close the knowledge gaps identified in
the state-of-the-art review concerning the factors in
automated system design that differentially affect human
perception, cognition, and performance. The research results
will be used to augment and refine models for predicting
human performance in operating automated systems. The
testing of these augmented models through simulation will in
turn yield information on gaps in understanding that need
further research. This iterative process will result in
models that will contain the best available knowledge on the
type, frequencies, and impact of human errors that specific
design factors tend to induce. These then will constitute
guidelines for the allocation of functions to man and to
machine that will be validated through ground based
simulation and ultimately flight test. These validated
guidelines will be available for use by the industry in
system design and by the FAA in certification and regulation.
A parallel effort will be undertaken to adapt "Knowledge
Engineering" methodology to aviatiult. NASA then will develop
guidelines for an integrated cockpit alert and warning system
(ICAWS) and pilot-decision aids through:
(1) applying "knowledge engineering" methodology;
(2) applying the heuristic data base; and,
(3) basic research studies on human capabilities,
limitations, and tendencies, with alternative
design characteristics for those systems. This
will result in guidelines for determining what
planning and monitoring functions can and should be
automated. These guidelines will be validated
through simulation and finally through flight tests.
xr
	 II.	 Man-Machine Interface Design Guidelines
4	 GOAL:	 Develop a technology base for choosing advanced displays and
advanced input devices for effective information transfer
between the operator and system.
t
RESOURCES:
'	 Fiscal Year	 1983 1984 1985 1986	 1987	 1988
Funding ($1000's) 350 1,000 1,350 1,700 2,200 2,700
Direct Man-Years
	
2	 8	 10	 12	 12	 14
APPROACH:
Input Devices
R
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• Synthesize the state-of-the-art in human factors aspects of
advanced input devices (keyboards, voice recognition, touch
panels, etc.).
This study will summarize which human capabilities and
limitations are important determinants of input-device
performance as well as the gaps in our understanding of how
the related design factors affect human performance.
• Undertake basic human factors studies to close the knowledge
gaps identified in the state-of-the-art. Use the resulting
knowledge to augment and refine techniques to aid in the
choice of input devices. The evaluation of the refined
techniques: will open further questions. The basic research
will continue to address those questions throughout the
program. The resulting techniques will allow designers to
select suitable candidate devices for their systems based on
the best available knowledge of the effects of in-put device
characteristics on the performance of the human operator.
• Develop guidelines based on the advantages and disadvantages
of various input devices; validate guidelines through basic
studies, simulation, and flight tests. The state-of-the-art
data base and the techniques to be developed will be combined
to provide guidelines on the selection of input devices.
31
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Advanced Displays
o Develop heuristic data base to aid in choosing displayed
information and formats. Where possible, this study will
synthesize previous experience into guidelines for display
design, and will identify knowledge gaps concerning the
effects of display design on human operator performance.
o Develop guidelines and techniques for choosing symbols and
display format through basic laboratory studies, simulation,
and aircraft test. Laboratory studies and models will be
used to further refine techniques for determining information
requirements and choice of display formats.
	
o	 Conduct research to determine human operator capabilities and
limitations in using adaptive displays to develop guidelines
i	 for the design of displays that automatically adapt to
changing conditions.
	
III.	 Workload and Performance-Measurement Methods
	
GOAL:	 Develor, Methods for assessing crew workload and performance
in a manual/automated environment.
RESOURCES:
Fiscal Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Funding ($1000's) 800 600 600 600 600 300
Direct Man-Years 4 4 4 4 4 2
APPROACH:
o	 Continue development of subjective workload component
measurement techniques. Workload measures of man-in-the-loop
conditions are required for evaluation of existing systems
and for use with predictive efforts.
o Develop predictive measures of cognitive and decision-making
workload by adapting and expanding current manually
administered workload measures. The resulting models can be
used to predict workload as a function of task demands and
operating environment so that workload can be assessed before
actual simulation.
o Develop objective measures of cognitive, decision-making, and
resource-management performance of the crew through basic
studies, simulations, and aircraft testing. These techniques
will allow identification and quantification of the more
important determinants of system performance.
IV. Man-Machine Reliability Asessment Techniques
GOAL: Develop
	 methodology	 to	 assePa	 overall	 reliability	 of	 the
4 man-machine systems.
APPROACH:
NOTE: In the proposed NASA plan, 	 the data necessary to accomplish
this
	
program	 segment	 would	 be	 obtained	 from	 the	 research
effort to be conducted under the program segments I, 	 II, and
III as noted.
o Synthesize
	
the	 state-of-the-art	 for	 assessing manned	 system
reliability;	 highlight omissions,
	 and degrees of	 success	 in
previous
	 efforts.	 This	 study	 will	 pinpoint	 where	 further
efforts	 will	 produce	 the	 most	 payoff	 (state-of-the-art
synthesis
	 from	 the	 heuristic
	 data	 base	 element	 in	 program
segments I, II, and III).
o Undertake basic human factors studies to close knowledge gaps
identified above.	 Adapt	 and	 develop	 promising	 theories	 of
human error	 (theories of	 human
	
error,	 is	 contained	 in	 the
"human operator models" element of program segmen t r),
o Develop techniques for evaluating	 the system-wide 	 impact	 of
human errors.	 The importance of human error is determined by
the	 impact
	
on	 overall	 system	 reliability;	 this	 program
segment	 will	 produce	 techniques	 (e.g.,	 simulation,	 tree
analysis,
	
hazard	 analysis)	 to	 evaluate	 the	 effect	 of	 human
errors	 (error	 impact	 evaluation,	 is	 contained	 in	 program
segments I and III).
E:^
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